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Abstract 
This paper is a personal reflection of the role of a Permanent Representative in Brussels. It offers 
insights into the thought processes of an individual member of COREPER which plays a central role 
in the EU’s negotiating system. Permanent Representatives are ‘boundary managers’ between the 
domestic and the EU. The complex thought processes of an EU ambassador are analysed by focussing 
on seven different dimensions of this complex role. 
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 1 
Introduction* 
In 2012 I was invited by the London School of Economics to contribute to a lecture series on the 
European Union. Having moved from being Irish Permanent Representative in Brussels to take up my 
job as Ireland's Ambassador in London some three years before that, my direct knowledge of the EU 
negotiating process had become several years, several fast-moving and turbulent years for Europe, out 
of date. I therefore chose to speak at the LSE not about the European issues of the day but rather, in a 
more reflective way, about what it actually feels like to be an EU negotiator; and, in particular, to give 
a sense what goes on inside the mind of a member of COREPER
1
.
2
  
It is not the purpose of this article to offer a detailed analysis of the workings of COREPER.
 
Rather 
it attempts to convey a sense of the psychological experience of being the Permanent Representative 
of an EU Member State in Brussels operating in one of the most interesting and challenging 
negotiating environments in the world. It is at COREPER level that the most difficult negotiating 
issues are usually settled or at which those issues, if they cannot be settled, are shaped for 
consideration and decision by Ministers. 
So what goes through the mind of a Permanent Representative at COREPER? I read somewhere 
that it has been calculated that at any meeting, on average, 50% of the participants are listening to 
proceedings, 20% are sleeping and 30% are indulging a private fantasy. What follows is therefore my 
best attempt to explain what half of COREPER may be thinking at any one time. I would suggest that 
the necessarily complex thought patterns of a Permanent Representative at COREPER may perhaps be 
considered as falling under seven dimensions.
3
 A Permanent Representative does exactly what it says 
on the tin: he represents his Government and country and sits behind his country's nameplate. His role 
is to represent the national interests of his country in EU negotiations (even if it is always important to 
recall that there is an important European dimension to the national interest of each Member State as 
explained below). 
The Permanent Representative: A Complex Role  
Given that the purpose and role of a Permanent Representative is to represent his country, the first 
dimension of his thinking at COREPER will normally be to ask “what (if any) are the instructions 
                                                     
*
 Bobby McDonagh, Ireland’s Ambassador to Italy, 2013. 
1
 COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, is the senior negotiating body at official level in the European 
Union. It sits in two formations: COREPER 2 comprising the Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors) of the Member 
States to the European Union; and COREPER 1 in which the Deputy Permanent Representatives (Deputy Ambassadors) 
sit. The European Commission participates in both formations. It is the negotiating funnel through which the great 
majority of the work of the European Union passes: upwards from the myriad working groups below, which report to 
COREPER, through to the Council of Ministers above and, when necessary, to the European Council. COREPER 
typically meets for several days each week, often late into the night. COREPER also has regular working lunches as well 
as occasional “Ambassadors-only” sessions for particularly confidential discussions. I was myself a direct participant in 
COREPER for seven years, four years as Ireland's Permanent Representative to the EU from 2005 to 2009 and, many 
years earlier, from 1987 to 1990, as Ireland's COREPER co-ordinator (“Antici”). Additionally, I interacted, often on a 
daily basis, with Irish representatives in COREPER for the best part of a dozen years working in the European Division 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin, including as Director General from 2001 to 2005.  
2
 The LSE encouraged me to set out my presentation in writing which I am belatedly doing. I would like to thank my 
successor as Permanent Representative, Rory Montgomery, Ireland’s current Permanent Representative, Declan Kelleher, 
and Professor Brigid Laffan of the European University Institute for their helpful comments .  
3
 I refer to a Permanent Representative as “he”. This will facilitate ease of reading. However, it should be noted that the 
number of female Permanent Representatives thus far appointed has been pitifully small. I am pleased to say that the first 
woman appointed to the position was my predecessor in Brussels. 
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from my capital?” A Permanent Representative, like any diplomat, is not an independent empire. He 
does not invent his own positions or act on a personal whim. In representing his country, he receives 
“instructions”, or directions, from the Government which he represents. 
On every agenda item, the Permanent Representative will need to know and to have digested what 
his national “instructions” are. Instructions can take many shapes and sizes. On a given item, they can 
be detailed or exiguous or even non-existent. They can take the form of anything from detailed written 
argumentation accompanied by suggested “speaking points” to a bare few sentences. Instructions can 
also be conveyed or backed up orally (even via a quick phone call during the COREPER meeting 
itself). In principle, written instructions should arrive in the course of the day before the meeting to 
which they refer although last minute instructions or adjustments to instructions are not uncommon.  
The level of detail will differ depending on how complex an agenda item is, on how important it is 
to the Member State in question and on whether that Member State faces particular negotiating 
difficulties in relation to it. The level of detail of instructions also tends to vary between Member 
States, with some countries being much more structured and formal than others in their approach. The 
nature and quality of instructions will also vary depending on the Ministry or the individual issuing the 
instructions. Instructions will normally have been received the evening before the meeting at which 
the item is to be discussed but can also arrive at last minute. 
Instructions can be prepared either in the capital or in Brussels by the relevant expert in the 
Permanent Representation based in turn on any number of recent or previous communications he has 
had with his capital. In the case of some Member States, all instructions for COREPER are centrally 
coordinated, by the EU Division in the Prime Minister’s Office or Foreign Ministry. In other cases, the 
instructions come from individual ministries with the Prime Minister’s Office and Foreign Ministry 
taking only a light overview of the instructions and intervening only where they consider this 
necessary – for example, to soften hard-line negotiating stances of individual Ministries which may 
run counter to a broader national position or which may make little sense in negotiating terms.  
Instructions will typically reflect coordination and compromise between different Ministries. In the 
case of issues of major national interest, such as the EU’s overall approach to climate change, the 
coordination process will be particularly intense with the Prime Minister’s office typically playing a 
central role. Instructions can, of course, also be contradictory if two Ministries or individuals cannot 
agree or fully agree. For various reasons, including occasionally where there may be a dispute 
regarding departmental responsibilities, there may be no instructions at all.  
Moreover, beyond the instructions received for a specific meeting, the Permanent Representative 
will, as a matter of routine, also need to factor-in longstanding national positions, which do not need to 
be restated in formal instructions on every occasion but which nevertheless form the context for 
whatever specific instructions he receives.  
In principle, instructions - whatever form they take or however they are received - are deemed to be 
instructions from the Permanent Representative’s Government. In some cases of particular sensitivity 
the relevant Minister or even the Prime Minister will have been consulted. Needless to say, however, 
that does not mean that the Prime Minister or national Government as such has been consulted on 
every instruction. But the instructions are nevertheless Government instructions in that the officials 
who draft them are responsible to one or more Ministers who in turn are responsible to the 
Government as a whole. In a formal sense, the level at which the instructions are sent to a Permanent 
Representative is irrelevant; the official drafting the instructions will more often than not be junior in 
rank to the Permanent Representative but the instructions are nevertheless to be read as Government 
instructions. 
Typically, a Permanent Representative will prepare for a COREPER meeting on the evening 
before. Some Permanent Representatives will tend to rely essentially on the written instructions 
received, seeking clarifications only as required here and there – either from the competent expert in 
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the Permanent Representation or from the relevant Department. Others, perhaps a majority, will also 
arrange oral briefing sessions (on the evening before the meeting, early on the morning of the meeting 
or both) with the relevant experts from the Permanent Representation. These supplementary oral 
briefings are, in my experience, important in clarifying, for example, negotiating priorities and 
objectives, the likely positions of other Member States, and indeed with a view sometimes simply to 
understanding highly complex subjects with which the relevant expert will be most familiar.  
A Permanent Representative will often have sought to clarify or adjust instructions, if not entirely 
happy with them, in advance of a meeting or have sought supplementary instructions on a point not 
initially covered. Armed with an array of instructions, subsequent clarifications and underlying 
national positions, he heads into COREPER.  
Instructions for COREPER, however, will never be delivered at the COREPER meeting exactly as 
drafted. The second dimension of a Permanent Representative’s thought process will be to ask 
himself how he should interpret and use his instructions. He will often have a wide measure of 
discretion in that regard. 
The fundamental question a Permanent Representative must ask himself, beyond what his national 
position is, is how best to advance that position. Simply reading out instructions as drafted would in 
almost all cases have minimal impact in advancing the interests which the instructions are designed to 
promote. Instructions need to be adapted on the spot, at the coal-face of the negotiations, to last minute 
information, to the negotiating environment, to the mood of a meeting, to new proposals emerging, 
above all to achievable outcomes. Put simply, capitals know what they want in an ideal world. 
Permanent Representatives, participating in the actual negotiations, have a better sense of what can be 
achieved in the real world. This is to a very large extent understood in capitals. Where it is not 
understood there can be tensions and recriminations. 
By way of example, on a particular agenda item a Permanent Representative’s capital may have 
conveyed instructions covering what it considers to be perhaps two important points and four less 
important ones. It will normally be clearer to the Permanent Representative than to his capital how 
many and which of his capital’s desiderata are likely to be achievable. In almost all cases, limiting the 
number of negotiating aims in relation to an agenda item will be more effective than a scattergun 
approach. In terms of promoting national interests, it is likely to be more effective to press a small 
number of points based around an assessment of importance and achievability than to read out a 
shopping list of objectives identified at a distance and set out in the formal instructions.  
A Permanent Representative has many potential tactical options available in order to refine his 
negotiating objectives. Most simply, he can use his own judgement to narrow down and prioritise the 
objectives which he is seeking to advance at COREPER; and in many cases the capital will allow him 
the latitude to do this. Alternatively, he can make clear his prioritisation between issues in the 
language or tone he uses when he intervenes at COREPER, or by the order in which he addresses the 
issues. Another example of a technique used for prioritisation between possible objectives is to present 
the most important points orally and then add that the remainder of the points will be sent to the 
Presidency or Council Secretariat in writing – which is akin to saying “look, if you can take some 
these additional points aboard, great. If not, we won’t die in the ditch”. On the one hand, such an 
approach increases the chances of advancing the more important achievable points (presented orally); 
on the other hand it softens the blow for the system at home which is not being asked to accept that its 
other points have been entirely overlooked.  
Another gambit available to a Permanent Representative is to play on the different levels at which a 
subject can be discussed rather than necessarily using up “COREPER ammunition” on an unattainable 
point. If he considers that pursuing too many of the points in his instructions will in practice mean 
achieving little or no progress on any of them, a Permanent Representative can suggest to COREPER 
that one or more of the points require more work at working group level. Or he can suggest that a 
point must go up to Ministerial level. Referring a matter to Ministerial level can mean many things: for 
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example that it is a matter more appropriate for Ministers; that if COREPER doesn’t deal with it 
Member States will have to brief their Ministers to deal with it; that in effect the point is being 
conceded - drafting compromises are much easier to reach at COREPER and in practice Ministers are 
usually not inclined to flog dead horses. 
Another possibility is for a Permanent Representative to suggest that an item be postponed until the 
following week’s COREPER when maybe he will have fewer national fish to fry or more allies on 
board or when maybe the position of his Government has been clarified or adapted somewhat (perhaps 
in the light of discussion at COREPER).    
In a small number of cases, a Permanent Representative will know that an instruction from his 
capital is simply a non-runner, and indeed a waste of negotiating ammunition, but that this is not 
understood or accepted in his capital and that he therefore has no alternative to giving the idea an 
airing at COREPER. It is not unknown in such circumstances for a Permanent Representative to start 
his intervention by saying something like “my instructions inform me” or “for the record”. Such 
language is immediately understood around the table as “going through the motions”. (It goes without 
saying that I have never used this approach myself). 
Yet another consideration is that entirely different issues can sometimes be linked from a 
negotiating point of view. If, for example, a member of COREPER has some very important points to 
make on, say, a Justice and Home Affairs issue in the afternoon, he is unlikely - with a view to 
negotiating effectiveness - to wish to be pursuing too many, say, budgetary issues in the morning. It is 
simply not possible to have “crucial” concerns on every occasion (as “the boy who cried wolf” would 
confirm).  
Another occasional challenge is to avoid potential internal contradictions between the points one is 
making on one issue and another. 
Every Permanent Representative strongly welcomes good clear instructions. However, to be of 
maximum use, instructions should take account of the real negotiating environment and of realistic 
outcomes, and should leave sufficient flexibility to Permanent Representative on the spot to pursue 
national objectives as effectively as possible.  
The third dimension of a Permanent Representative’s psychology is to decide what negotiating 
style is best to adopt.  
There are undoubtedly different national negotiating styles which reflect national characteristics, 
traditions, education systems and perceptions as to how to achieve optimal negotiating outcomes. 
Some Member States are better than others at digging in their heels: when they say “no” colleagues 
around the table know that it will be difficult to budge them. This negotiating style is often combined 
with an assertive manner of expression. Other Member States adopt a more conciliatory negotiating 
style and are more readily open to compromises. In general it is easier for large Member States to act 
tough but not all large Member States adopt the same style. 
Personality can also, of course, play an important role in negotiating styles. Sometimes personality 
reflects nationality type; sometimes not. The Permanent Representative of a country generally known 
for its assertiveness can be mild-mannered and vice versa. In my view, for effectiveness, individuals 
should normally to the extent possible align their general day-to-day negotiating style with their 
natural personality. A style may, of course, have to be adapted to the particular negotiating situation. 
Contrary to what some capitals or commentators may think, it is far from clear that a more 
confrontational assertive style of negotiation is in the long run more effective. Indeed if anything over 
time the opposite is probably the case. In the EU, there is a collective interest in being constructive. 
While each Member State rightly pursues its own national interests, by definition nobody gets 
everything they want. It is important therefore for a negotiator not to lose sight of the fact that the 
Member States have a shared interest in balanced effective compromises. That shared interest, at a 
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deeper level, is actually a national interest. It is also good from a national interest point of view to be 
reasonably flexible: if a member of COREPER is flexible when colleagues have serious concerns on 
various issues, those colleagues are in turn more likely to be flexible towards him when he himself has 
an important concern on an issue. Scripture may have got it right when it suggests, even if intended as 
a counsel of altruism rather than a negotiating tactic, that you should do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you.  
Striking the right tone can be an immensely important negotiating tool. Any negotiator who ignores 
considerations such as those set out above, apart from not helping the negotiating process, will not be 
advancing his country’s interests to best effect. In short, maximising demands is not the same as 
optimising outcomes.  
These realities explain why the abiding ethos of COREPER is one of accommodation rather than 
isolation, one of compromise rather than one of notching up victories. While the voting procedure 
which applies in a particular case, unanimity or QMV, always lurks in the background and can shape 
the overall way an issue is perceived, COREPER’s consistent approach is to seek to accommodate 
every sensitivity rather than to override sensitivities with majorities. 
A fourth dimension of what a Permanent Representative needs to think about is at what point in 
the discussion of an item he should intervene. 
The nature of negotiations in COREPER, as in other EU negotiating fora, has evolved, especially 
since the big bang enlargement in 2004. The EU had coped reasonably well with 27 (now 28) Member 
States around the table. The increasingly complex machine, perhaps against the odds, has continued to 
function effectively. However, successive enlargements have had an impact: individual interventions 
are necessarily shorter; discussion has become more managerial and less philosophical. Individual 
interventions tend to be more succinctly focussed on practical outcomes than on the reasoning behind 
the views expressed.  
In the 1980s when I first experienced COREPER on a regular basis it was fairly typical for every 
Member State to intervene on each agenda item. These days, full “table rounds” take place much less 
frequently, although “table rounds” (sometimes clockwise and sometimes anti-clockwise) are still 
used, in particular in discussing draft European Council Conclusions in relation to which it is assumed 
that every Member State will have something to say. 
4
  
These developments reflect the nature of a larger Union and are not necessarily a bad thing but they 
do represent a change which the negotiator must factor in. 
In COREPER these days, it will often be most effective to intervene early in a discussion. The first 
three or four speakers on an agenda item, are likely to shape the debate, with others either intervening 
more briefly to agree with one of the points of view already expressed or deciding that the points they 
would have made have already been adequately covered. The chairman of COREPER will never 
decline a request for the floor; but if a Permanent Representative does not intervene early on an item, 
the discussion tends to have drifted away from him. 
                                                     
4
 Interestingly, I understand that since the appointment of a permanent President of the European Council, allied to the 
greater frequency of (crisis-driven) European Councils, the nature of discussion at COREPER on the preparation of 
European Council conclusions has further evolved. While the rotating Presidency remains in the chair of COREPER for 
the discussion, the control of the draft European Council Conclusions (as distinct from normal Council conclusions) is in 
the hands of the President of the European Council , whose chef de cabinet represents him at the relevant COREPER 
discussion and essentially steers the discussion. These days, in the COREPER “table rounds” on the European Council 
Conclusions, each Permanent Representative makes a pitch on his core issues and backs this up with written proposals. 
There tends to be no textual horse-trading around the table, and the pen remains in the hands of the President of the 
European Council and his staff. 
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However, there will also be cases when it is better to hold back initially. For example, a Permanent 
Representative may wish to see how a particular debate evolves in order to be in a position to 
synthesise colleagues’ positions or otherwise to pitch his intervention most effectively. Judgement on 
how and when to intervene often evolves in the course of a discussion as the trend of opinion becomes 
clear. In many cases, if discussion is clearly going in the right direction, it may be judged better not to 
intervene at all and thus to conserve negotiating ammunition. 
On some occasions, if a point of view is likely to be controversial or unpopular, it may be better to 
allow a like-minded colleague to intervene first drawing some of the heat before then intervening 
briefly simply to support the position expressed.  
It is often important to build support or understanding for a national position, especially when that 
position is sensitive and risks being a minority one. Sometimes even constructing a wider alliance on 
the point may be necessary. Building and deploying such support may be considered the fifth 
dimension of a Permanent Representative’s reflections.  
In the European Union there is no such thing as a permanent alliance. Certain groups of countries 
do tend to think in a broadly similar way and some even coordinate in a structured way. Benelux and 
the Nordic countries are perhaps the most obvious examples. But even Belgium and Luxembourg will 
disagree strongly when national interest requires. Essentially alliances are formed subject by subject 
and issue by issue with whichever Member State or Member States share, or can be persuaded to 
share, a position. For this reason, networking with each and every Member State is crucial for 
members of COREPER as indeed it is for negotiators at every level in the EU. Self-evidently the more 
influential a Member State, the more important it is to have it on one’s side. Size tends to be an 
important indicator of such influence, but the personal ability, standing and persuasiveness of an 
individual member of COREPER can also count for a great deal.  
The development of shared approaches and alliances can be done at any level, from technical 
expert to Prime Minister, and through any channel, from corridor chat to capital to capital phone-calls. 
A Permanent Representative will rely on his colleagues at working group level and in his capital to use 
their influence as best they can. However, he will also himself contact COREPER colleagues as he 
deems most likely to be effective in seeking their support - the evening before a COREPER meeting, 
before the meeting is about to start or often during the meeting itself. A text message across the room 
can encourage an intervention or suggest a line. 
A Permanent Representative will also need to judge the nature and depth of support from 
colleagues. It is not just a question of numbers. Will a like-minded country, for example, take the 
initiative or the lead? Will it be prepared to take the flak? Will it carry support expressed at COREPER 
level through to support at Ministerial level? Considerations such as these are crucial. There is no 
point girding a Minister’s loins for a battle at Council level if his “allies” are going to fade away at the 
first sign of trouble.  
Sometimes mutual support between two Member States can cover several different specific points 
because of a shared approach to the overall subject under discussion. Member States may also 
occasionally support each other on some issue at COREPER because of a current unconnected issue in 
the background. Personal friendships can also play a role from time to time (principally on issues on 
which no national interest is at stake for the Permanent Representative providing the support).  
Obtaining the support of the European Commission, which participates at COREPER, can of 
course be as important, even more important, than getting the support of another Member State. 
Influencing the Commission as the initiator of legislation, ideally at a very early stage long before an 
issue comes near COREPER, is an important part of the role of a Permanent Representative. The 
Council Secretariat which does not generally speak at COREPER but sits at the table, advises the 
Presidency and often drafts the compromises is also a key player. The European Parliament is, of 
course, another increasingly vital actor in the wider negotiating process and each Permanent 
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Representation must factor in that dimension also. A Permanent Representative is accredited to the 
European Union and all its institutions (rather than just to COREPER and the Council). 
Beyond advancing national interests, narrowly defined, it is important that a Permanent 
Representative also has a strong eye to the wider European interest. This may be considered a sixth 
dimension which he needs to bear in mind. As indicated above, an EU negotiator should always be 
conscious of the European dimension to his national interests. While he should not be expected to 
pursue perceived wider European interests if these run counter to identified national interests, he 
should recognize that, as a Member State of the European Union, his country has a profound national 
interest in a Europe which functions effectively. The negotiating tactics of a Permanent Representative 
will most frequently reflect primarily national perceptions but his negotiating strategy should, insofar 
as possible, recognise two important things: (a) that without compromise there can be no agreement; 
and (b) that there is no point each Member State emerging from a dogfight with its share of spoils if 
the outcome is a dog’s dinner for everyone.  
This important dimension to the pursuit of national interest is always subtly but pervasively in the 
background. It can influence the points made or not made, the tone used, the compromises accepted.  
A specific role which a Permanent Representative can play in the common interest is to identify 
and propose compromises on issues in relation to which he has no specific national interest to 
promote. As English is now the dominant language in COREPER, the Permanent Representatives 
from English-speaking Member States tend to be looked to more frequently than others in this context. 
An ability to identify compromises contributes over time to the standing and negotiating strength 
within COREPER of the negotiator in question. 
The seventh and final dimension of the mindset of an EU Permanent Representative is the 
importance of bearing in mind how his interventions at COREPER, and the outcome of the 
negotiations, will be perceived and judged by the authorities in his capital. 
A Permanent Representative’s mental focus should be on the negotiations themselves. Inevitably, 
however, given that a Permanent Representative is operating on behalf of his Government, part of his 
brain will be computing how the negotiation will be viewed at home. Inevitably, he will not be able to 
deliver everything his authorities wanted. He will be wondering to what extent his authorities will be 
satisfied with how he has adapted and used his instructions and with his level of success in achieving 
their negotiating objectives. He will be very conscious of how discussions at COREPER and in 
particular his own interventions are reported to his capital by his notetakers. He is wondering also 
whether his colleagues at home will be subtle and sensible in assessing the next steps: will they, for 
example, insist on fighting a losing battle at Ministerial level or again at COREPER the following 
week?  
A technique often used at COREPER is to place a “reserve” (a “substantive” reserve or a softer 
“study” reserve) on an issue. Such a reserve means that a Member State has not definitively signed off 
on a matter but it can betoken quite different things: anything from a trenchant indication to partners 
that the issue will have to be addressed again at a higher level to a gentle message to one’s capital that 
the point, if not actually dead, is on life support. Another way of letting a national position down 
gently is to “enter a statement for the minutes” or to ask the Commission or the Presidency or 
COREPER as a whole to make such a statement. It obviously falls well short of having one’s 
fundamental point accepted but, by providing a basis for the matter to be considered again or reviewed 
at a later date, it can be reassuring to the capital concerned and sometimes of significant importance. 
I should add that a Permanent Representative at COREPER will in the course of a COREPER 
meeting also be considering other EU matters. As often as not, at the end of a day at COREPER, he 
will be handed another detailed brief for the following day - for another COREPER meeting or for a 
meeting of the Council of Ministers at which he will be advising a Minister or himself representing his 
country or for a negotiation with the European Parliament. He will often have coordination or policy 
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issues to be considered and resolved in relation to such future meetings which cannot be left to the 
following day. COREPER meetings can also offer a useful opportunity for a Permanent 
Representative to discuss completely different matters, perhaps over a coffee outside the meeting 
room, with his counterparts. The rise of smart phones/tablets makes it easier to do “other” business 
during COREPER but can naturally be distracting. 
Many of those reading this analysis will no doubt have got distracted by a private fantasy. But I 
hope that those who have stuck with it have a slightly better understanding of what an EU Permanent 
Representative may be thinking at COREPER.  
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